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Abstract: Most state-of-the art approaches for securing XML documents allow users to access
data only through authorized views defined by annotating an XML grammar (e.g. DTD) with a
collection of XPath expressions. To prevent improper disclosure of confidential information, user
queries posed on these views need to be rewritten into equivalent queries on the underlying docu-
ments. This rewriting enables us to avoid the overhead of view materialization and maintenance.
A major concern here is that query rewriting for recursive XML views is still an open problem.
To overcome this problem, some works have been proposed to translate XPath queries into non-
standard ones, called Regular XPath queries. However, query rewriting under Regular XPath can
be of exponential size as it relies on automaton model. Most importantly, Regular XPath remains a
theoretical achievement. Indeed, it is not commonly used in practice as translation and evaluation
tools are not available. In this paper, we show that query rewriting is always possible for recursive
XML views using only the expressive power of the standard XPath. We investigate the extension
of the downward class of XPath, composed only by child and descendant axes, with some axes
and operators and we propose a general approach to rewrite queries under recursive XML views.
Unlike Regular XPath-based works, we provide a rewriting algorithm which processes the query
only over the annotated DTD grammar and which can run in linear time in the size of the query.
An experimental evaluation demonstrates that our algorithm is efficient and scales well.
Key-words: Queries Rewriting, XML Access control, XML views, XPath.
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Interrogation Sécurisée des Vues XML
Récursives:
Une Technique basée sur le Standard XPath
Résumé : La plupart des travaux existant autour du contrôle d’accès des
documents XML se basent sur la définition d’une vue pour chaque utilisateur
qui représente les parties des données dont il est autorisé à lire et/ou modifier.
Cette vue est le résultat de l’annotation de la grammaire associée au document
XML (par exemple une DTD) par différentes conditions d’accès exprimées sous
forme d’expressions XPath. Pour empêcher l’accès à des données confidentielles
– cachées par la vue –, chaque requête posée par l’utilisateur sur la vue doit
être réécrite pour qu’elle soit évaluée en toute sécurité sur le document original.
Cette réécriture permet d’éviter le coût de la matérialisation et de la mainte-
nance de la vue. Cependant, la réécriture des requêtes XPath dans le cas des
vues XML récursives reste un probleme ouvert. Pour pallier à ce problème, cer-
tains travaux ont proposé de travailler avec un langage de requêtes non-standard,
appelé “Regular XPath”. Néanmoins, le langage “Regular XPath” reste au stade
théorique car aucun outil d’évaluation n’est disponible en pratique. Une implé-
mentation de ce langage est basée sur les automates, ce qui peut engendrer une
complexité de réécriture exponentielle.
Dans ce papier, nous montrons que la réécriture des requêtes XPath dans le
cas des vues XML récursives est possible sans passer par des transformations
vers d’autres langages (tel que “Regular XPath”), et peut être faite en temps
linéaire. Nous étudions l’extension du fragment XPath, appelé en anglais down-
ward class (composé seulement par les axes child et descendant), par certains
axes et opérateurs XPath. En nous basant sur cette extension, nous proposons
un modèle général pour réécrire des requètes XPath pour des vues XML arbi-
traires, récursives ou non. Une phase d’expérimentation montre bien l’efficacité
ainsi que le passage à l’échelle de notre algorithme de réécriture.
Mots-clés : Réécriture des requêtes, Contrôle d’accès pour documents XML,
Vues XML, XPath.
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1 Introduction
XML has become the standard of representation and exchange of data across
the web. With this emergence, a challenge is raised with regards to the security
of XML documents whose content is available to one or more users based on
their access privileges. First access control models for securing XML have been
proposed in [7, 10, 16]. However, these models suffer from various limitations.
They can cause leakage of sensitive information [7], focus on the annotation of
the entire XML data to deal with the static analysis limitations [10], or based
on costly schemes for rewriting user queries [16].
To avoid these problems, the notion of XML security views was studied by
Fan et al. [4]. We briefly review the main principle of the XML security view-
based approaches. We start by the fragment of XPath, called downward class,
where the axes are limited to child and descendant axes. We use this fragment
since it is commonly used in practice. A conform XML document T w.r.t a
DTD D (i.e. T is an instance of D), can be queried simultaneously by different
users. For each class of users a security view is defined by annotating D with
some access conditions to specify the (in)accessible element types of the DTD.
The annotated version of D is later sanitized by removing the inaccessible ele-
ment types which results in a DTD view Dv. Then the security view is defined
as V=(Dv, σ) where Dv is given to the users, which describes accessible data
they are able to see, and σ is a function used to extract for each XML document
T conforms to D, its view Tv representing only authorized data of the users.
Each query over the view Tv is translated into an equivalent one in order to be
evaluated over the original data T.
Problem Statement. The problem of XPath queries rewriting studied in this
paper is defined as follows:
Given a DTD D, an XML security view V=(Dv, σ), and an XPath query
Q over Dv. The rewriting problem consists in defining a rewriting function
R that computes another XPath query R(Q) over the original document
D such that: for any instance T of D and its view Tv computed w.r.t V ,
the evaluation of Q on Tv yields the same result as the evaluation of R(Q)
on T.
Most of the security view-based approaches of XPath queries rewriting deal
only with non-recursive DTDs [4, 9, 11]. A DTD is recursive iff at least one
of its elements is defined (directly or indirectly) in terms of itself. Note that
recursive DTDs often arise when specifying medicals data and the problem of
query rewriting is more intriguing in this case. A security view is recursive, if
its view Dv is recursive.
For each pair of element types A and B in the DTD, the σ function is an
XPath expression denoting the set of paths to reach an element B from an
element A in the DTD view (where some element types are hidden between A
and B and generated by σ). However, in the case of recursive DTDs, the σ
function is not computable since there may be an infinite set of paths from A to
B and the notion of security view (as defined above) cannot be used in queries
rewriting. That is why some authors [5, 8] resort to the use of Regular XPath
to avoid this problem. However, Regular XPath remains of theoretical use since
no evaluation tools have been provided for practical use of this langage.
Inria
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To the best of our knowledge, no practical approach exists for answering
queries under recursive XML security views. Accordingly, the XPath query
rewriting remains an open issue.
Contribution. Our main contribution is making possible the query rewriting
for recursive XML security views using only the expressive power of the standard
XPath. We show that extending the downward class of XPath queries with some
axes and operators is sufficient to deal with the query rewriting under recursion
(without the need of the Kleene star or the translation from XPath to Regular
XPath).
Intuitively, for a query Q based on the downward class of XPath, our rewrit-
ing solution consists in computing another query Q′ = R(Q) using an extended
fragment of XPath in such a way for any instance T of D and its view Tv (com-
puted w.r.t Dv) the evaluation of Q on Tv gives the same result than evaluating
Q′ on T.
We provide a linear rewriting algorithm for arbitrary views (recursive or
not) which, unlike Regular XPath-based works (relying on Mixed Finite Au-
tomata [5]), consists only in processing the query over the annotated DTD to
produce the equivalent query on any valid instance of the original DTD. We val-
idate our solution with a performance evaluation which shows that our rewriting
algorithm is efficient and scales well. Lastly, we show how our proposed solution
can be extended to deal with a large fragment of XPath (including upward-axes)
and to go beyond some limitations of existing access control specification lan-
guages.
Related Work. We briefly discuss two approaches of access control policy
enforcement for XML documents with or without XML grammar.
In [7] authors propose a formal model to specify access control for XML
documents independently of the DTD. The policy rules definition is based on
XPath and each query is rewritten by adding a predicate access (which rep-
resents all accessible data) to that query. We use the same predicate access
principle in our rewriting approach. However, inference of sensitive information
can be detected since only the last subquery is controlled among all subqueries
parsed by the query. To overcome this problem, we improve the method given
in [7] by attaching a predicate access to each entity (element/attribute) parsed
by the query.
Vercammen [16] proposes a new method based on the intersection and union
of XPath queries to avoid the problem of information leakage. The policy rules
are translated to a single query which stands for all accessible data; this query
is incorporated by intersection with each query requested over the user XML
document view. However, this approach yields the same performance than the
materialization of this view.
Other access control approaches are based on the notion of security views and
the query rewriting principle. Fan et al. [4] propose the notion of security view
by the annotation of a regular non-recursive DTD. The use of only downward
class of XPath queries allowed them to achieve more precise query rewriting,
i.e. computing all possible paths connecting each two adjacent elements in the
query, which provides practically performance gains for the query evaluation.
A view derivation algorithm is proposed to compute the DTD view, w.r.t. the
access conditions, and an optimization step is also done over the rewritten query.
RR n° 7834
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However, to keep the DTD view regular, an inaccessible element may be replaced
with anonymous element dummy which can be source of security breaches. In
[9, 11], authors refine the Fan’s model by eliminating dummies, extending the
class of XPath queries with upward -axes and with a novel notion of security
views. Different types of policies are also discussed. These works can deal only
with non-recursive DTDs. They are inapplicable to recursive DTDs because the
description of paths connecting two element types may be infinite.
Unlike the XPath query rewriting over non-recursive DTDs, the problem
posed by the recursion has not received a more attention. Authors of [5] extend
the principle proposed in [4] with a translation of XPath queries to Regular
XPath and propose a first algorithm for evaluating Regular XPath over XML
data. In [8], a more generalized rewriting approach has been studied by dealing
with restrictions on the class of queries and DTD types. The defined accessibility
function is based on the Kleene star. It should be noted that the Kleene star
cannot be expressed in the standard XPath.
Although the query formulation and rewriting on Regular XPath is more
expressive than the standard XPath, we cannot find any practical system for
both proposed approaches1. Consequently, the need of a rewriting system of
XPath queries over recursive XML security views remains an open issue.
Plan of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents formally the query rewriting problem for recursive views, and sketches
our solution to deal with this problem. In Section 3, we give the ingredients of
our access control specification. Our rewriting approach is detailed in Section
4. Section 5 presents how our approach can be extended to consider a large
fragment of XPath and used to overcome some limitations of existing access
control approaches. An implementation issue is presented in Section 6. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 7.
2 Formal Problem Statement
In this section we present the query rewriting problem for recursive views, and
sketch our solution to deal with this problem.
2.1 Preliminaries
We briefly review some notions of Document Type Definitions (DTDs) and the
class of XPath Queries most used in practice.
DTDs. Without loss of generality, we represent a DTD by a triple (Ele, P,
root), where Ele is a finite set of element types, root is a distinguished type in
Ele (called the root type) and P is a function defining element types such that
for any A in Ele, P(A) is a regular expression α defined with:
α := str | ǫ | B | α","α | α"|"α | α*
where str denotes the text type PCDATA, ǫ is the empty word, B is an element
type in Ele, and finally α","α, α"|"α, and α* denote concatenation, disjunction,
1According to [12] the SMOQE system proposed in [6] has been removed because of con-
duction of future researches.
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and the Kleene closure respectively. We refer to A → P (A) as the production
of A. For each element type B occurring in P(A), we refer to B as a subelement
type (or child type) of A and to A as a superelement type (or parent type) of
B. If an element type A is defined in term of an element type B directly (B is
subelement type of A) or indirectly, then A is an ancestor type of B and B is
a descendant type of A. The DTD is said recursive if some element type A is
defined in terms of itself directly or indirectly.
We use the graph representation to depict our DTDs where dashed edges
represent disjunction.
XML Documents. We model an XML document with an unranked ordered
finite node-labeled tree, also called XML Tree. Let Σ be a finite set of node
labels, an XML tree T over Σ is a structure defined as [15]: T = (N,R↓, R→, L)
where N is the set of nodes, R↓ ⊆ N × N is the parent-child relation, R→ ⊆
N × N is a successor relation on (ordered) siblings, and L : N → Σ assigns a
label to each node.
An XML document T conforms to a DTD D if the following conditions hold:
(i) the root of T is the unique node labeled with root ; (ii) each node in T is
labeled either with element type A, called A element, or with str, called text
node; (iii) for each node n of type A and with k ordered children n1, ..., nk, the
word L(n1), ..., L(nk) belongs to the regular language defined by P(A); (iv) each
text node carries a string value (PCDATA) and is the leaf of the tree. We call
T an instance of D if T conforms to D. In the DTD instances depicted in our
figures, we use Xi to distinguish between elements of the same type X.
XPath Queries. We introduce the downward class of XPath queries referred
to as X and defined as follows:
path := axis::label | path’[’qual’]’
| path’/’path | path’∪’path
qual := path | path = c
| qual and qual | qual or qual
| not qual | ’(’qual’)’
axis := ↓ | ↓+
where label refers to element type in Ele or * (that matches all labels), ∪ stands
for union, c denotes text constant, axis is the XPath axis relation, and ↓, ↓+
denote child and descendant axis respectively, and finally qual is called an XPath
qualifier (predicate or filter) which can be a text content comparison, an XPath
query, or a boolean expression (using boolean operators such as: and, or, not).
Let n be a node in an XML tree T. The evaluation of an XPath query p
at node n, called context node n, results in a set of nodes which are reachable
from n with p, denoted by n〚p〛. A qualifier q is said valid at node context n,
denoted by n  q, iff one of the following conditions holds: (i) q is given by p=c
and there is at least one element reachable from n with p which has c as text
content; (ii) q is an XPath query and n〚q〛 is nonempty; (iii) q is a boolean
expression (e.g. not(p)) and it is evaluated to true at n.
RR n° 7834
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2.2 XML Access Control Model
We define below some concepts of security specifications and XML security views
as initially presented in [4, 9].
Security Specifications. Given an XML document T conforms to a DTD D.
For each class of users some access privileges may be defined to restrict access
to sensitive information on T. Thus, an access-control specification language is
defined to specify what elements in T the users are granted, denied, or condi-
tionally granted access to. An access specification in this language is defined as
follows:
Definition 2.1 An access specification S is a pair (D,ann ) consisting of a DTD
D and a partial mapping ann such that, for each production A→ P (A) and each
element type B in P(A), ann(A,B), if explicitly defined, is an annotation of
the form:
ann(A,B) := Y | N | [Q]
where [Q] is a qualifier in our XPath fragment X . A special case is the root of
D for which we define ann(root)=Y by default. 
The specification values Y, N, and [Q] indicate that the B children of A elements
in an XML document conforms to the DTD D are accessible, inaccessible, or
conditionally accessible respectively. If ann(A,B) is not explicitly defined, then
B inherits the accessibility of A. On the other hand, if ann(A,B) is explicitly
defined then B may override the accessibility inherited from A. A text node is
accessible only if its parent element is accessible. For an element node n of type
B with parent node of type A, we say that n is concerned by an annotation if
ann(A,B)=value exists, moreover, this annotation is valid at n if value=Y, or
value=[Q ] and n  Q.
Security Views. To enforce an access specification, a security view is defined
to compute for each document T conforms to a DTD D : (i) an instance view
Tv containing only accessible data; and, (ii) a DTD view Dv which describes
schema of all accessible data. Both documents Tv and Dv are seen only by
authorized users.
More formally, let S=(D, ann) be an access specification. A security view
for S is defined as a pair V=(Dv, σ) where: (i) Dv is a view of D computed by
eliminating inaccessible element types2 from D, according to annotations given
in S ; (ii) σ is a function used to extract accessible data in such a way that for
each pair of types A and B where B occurs in P(A) in Dv, the σ(A,B) is an
XPath query (described in fragment X ) defining paths to reach element nodes
B from an element node A in the original document T conforms to D. It should
be noted that function σ is hidden from the users. A security view V=(Dv, σ)
is said recursive if its Dv is recursive.
Example 2.1 Consider the DTD D depicted in Figure 1(a) where the la-
bels of the edges represent the following access specification: ann(root,A)=[q ],
2An element type B is inaccessible if for each parent type A, either (i) the annotation
ann(A,B)=N exists or (ii) A is an inaccessible element type.
Inria
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Figure 1: Simple non-recursive DTD.
ann(A,B)=N, ann(A,C )=N, and ann(C,D)=Y. We define the security view
V=(Dv,σ) as follows:
3
Dv : root→ A, A→ D|ǫ, D → ǫ.
root → A: we have σ(root,A)=A[q ].
A → D|ǫ: we get σ(A,D)=(C ∪ ǫ)/D.
Figure 1(b) depicts the resulting view Dv. 
2.3 DTD Recursion Problem
Most existing approaches [4, 9, 11] for securing access to XML documents are
based on the notion of security view. Given a security view V=(Dv, σ), the
query rewriting principle is applied to translate each XPath query p over Dv
to another one pt over the original DTD D, such that for any instance T of D
(Tv of Dv resp.), pt over T yields the same answer as p over Dv (i.e. pt(T ) =
p(Tv))
4. Thanks to query rewriting we do not need to materialize view Tv and
its major problem namely the view maintenance. However, only non-recursive
DTDs are considered. The security view as specified before cannot be applied
in the case of recursive DTDs. To illustrate this problem we give the following
example:
Example 2.2 For the query ↓+::H over the DTD given in Figure 2(a), we
should enumerate all the paths from the root which give an accessible element
H (as done in [4]): /root/A[q]/(B ∪ D/E/G)/H. However, the task is com-
plicated in the case of recursion. With the same query over the DTD in Figure
2(b), the function σ used to extract accessible data, cannot be defined, e.g.
σ(D,E) can be E, F/G/D/E, or F/G/D/F/G/D/E etc. Then σ(D,E) leads
to infinitely many paths and cannot be defined in X . Moreover, the rewriting
of the query ↓+::H is equivalent to the following regular expression:
/root/A[q]/B/H ∪ /root/A[q]/q1/(q1)*/H ∪
/root/A[q]/(q2)*/D/E/G/(D/G)*/H
where: q1 = D /G ∪ D /E/G, and q2 = D /G ∪ D /E/G ∪ D /F/G. 
3Note that ǫ denotes the empty path.
4We denote by p(T) the result of evaluating query p over document T.
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Figure 2: DTD Recursion Problems.
Since the Kleene Star (denoted by *) is not part of the standard XPath and
cannot be expressed as outlined in [14,15], the rewriting of XPath queries is not
always possible. We refer to this problem as the non-closure of XPath fragment
under the query rewriting. The closure property is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 A class C of XPath queries is closed under query rewriting if
there is a function Rewrite: C → C that, for any security view V=(Dv, σ) and
any query Q in C over Dv, computes Qt=Rewrite(Q) in C such that for any
instance T conforms to the original DTD D and its view Tv w.r.t V , we have
Q(Tv) = Qt(T ). 
It has been shown in [5] that the downward class (i.e. fragment X ) of XPath
queries is not closed under query rewriting.
Theorem 1 For recursive XML security views, fragment X is not closed under
query rewriting [5]. 
2.4 Our Proposed Solution
We show that the expressive power of the standard XPath [2] is sufficient to
overcome the query rewriting problem over recursive views. We propose to re-
define function Rewrite given in Definition 2.2 into Rewrite: C1 → C2 where
C2 is the fragment C1 extended by adding some axes and operators. Using this
extension, for any access specification S=(D, ann) and any query Q in C1 over
Dv (view of D computed w.r.t S ), we can compute Qt = Rewrite(Q) in C2 such
that for any instance T of D and its view Tv w.r.t S, we have Q(Tv) = Qt(T ).
The input fragment C1 in our case is fragment X (namely the downward
class) defined in Section 2.1, which is used only to formulate user queries and
to define access specifications, while C2 is an extended fragment of X defined
as follows:
Inria
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path := axis::label | path’[’qual’]’ | path’[’n’]’
| path’/’path | path’∪’path
qual := path | path = c | path = ε::label
| qual and qual | qual or qual
| not qual | ’(’qual’)’
axis := ε | ↓ | ↑ | ↓+ | ↑+ | ↑∗
we enrich X by the self -axis (ε), the upward-axes parent (↑), ancestor (↑+),
and ancestor -or -self (↑∗), the position and the node comparison predicates.
The position predicate, defined with [n](n ∈ N ), is used to return the nth node
from an ordered set of nodes. For instance, since we model the XML document
with an ordered tree, the query ↓:: ∗[1] at an element node n returns its first
child element, while ↑+:: ∗[B =′ topo′][1] returns its first ancestor element which
has an child element B with text content ’topo’. The node comparison predicate
[target1=target2] is true only if the evaluation of the right and left sides result
in exactly the same single node. For example the predicate in the following
query ↓+:: A ↓:: /B[↑::* = ↑+::*[1]] is valid for any B element child of an A
element.
We summarize the augmented fragment of X by the following subsets X⇑
(X with self and upward -axes), X⇑[n] (X
⇑ with position predicate), and the final
fragment X⇑[n,=] (X
⇑
[n] with node comparison predicate).
It should be noted that for a given query Q, a rewriting technique must
ensure the following conditions: (i) each subquery5 of Q refers only to accessible
element nodes; and (ii) each relationship defined between two subqueries of Q
is respected. For instance, the query ↓+::D/↓::* over the access specification
depicted in Figure 2(b) must returns only accessible element nodes of type G
or E which have an accessible D element as parent.
We define the accessibility problem as: “When does an element node of
a given type is accessible?”. It is clear that the function σ cannot solve this
problem because of infinitely many possible paths involved by recursive views
(see Example 2.2). We show in the next that the accessibility of a given element
node w.r.t a given recursive view cannot be defined in the fragment X (even
in X⇑). We investigate the use of the augmented fragment X⇑[n] to solve the
accessibility problem in particular, and the fragment X⇑[n,=] as a solution to
avoid the non-closure of XPath fragment X in general.
2.5 Notations
Given an access specification S=(D, ann), and a document T conforms to D.
We define two predicates Aacc1 and A
acc
2 as follows
6:
Aacc1 := ↑
∗::*[ε::root
∨
ann(A′,A)∈ann ε::A/↑::A
′][1]
[ε::root
∨
(ann(A′,A)=Y |[Q])∈ann ε::A.σ(A
′, A)/↑::A′]
Aacc2 :=
∧
(ann(A′,A)=[Q])∈ann not (↑
+::A[not (Q )]/↑::A′)
5For example, the query ↓+::B[↓::C] contains two subqueries ↓+::B and ↓::C with a par-
ent/child relation defined between C and B, and an ancestor/descendant relation defined
between B and the node context at which the query is posed.
6Note that A.σ(A′, A) gives A[Q] if ann(A′,A)=[Q] and A otherwise.
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Where
∧
and
∨
denote conjunction and disjunction respectively. The pred-
icate Aacc1 has the form ↑
∗::*[qual1][1][qual2]. Applying ↑
∗::*[qual1] on
an element node n of T returns an ordered set S of element nodes (n and/or
some of its ancestor elements) such that for each one an annotation is defined.
Thus, with S[qual2] (n  A
acc
1 ) we ensure that the first element node in S is
concerned by a valid annotation. With the second predicate, we use n  Aacc2
to ensure that all qualifiers defined over ancestor elements of n are valid (we
discuss this restriction in Section 5.2). These predicates are “powerful tools” to
solve the accessibility problem as we will see in the next section.
Since the σ function is not computable in case of recursion, the parent/child
relation defined between two element types in the query (e.g. query ↓+::A/↓::B
defines parent/child relation between A and B) cannot be rewritten in X . Ac-
cordingly, we define the two predicates A+ and AB to rewrite parent/child
relation:
A+ := ↑+::*[Aacc1 ]
AB := A+[1]/ε::B
For an element node n in T, n〚A+ 〛 returns the set of all accessible ancestor
elements of n. The element node n has an accessible B element as parent if and
only if n  AB .
We use these four predicates throughout the paper to formalize our solution.
3 Access Control with Recursive DTDs
Our access control framework is presented in Figure 3. For each class of users,
the administrator defines an access specification S=(D, ann) over the DTD D.
The DTD view Dv is derived first and given to the users to formulate their
queries. For each instance T of D, we compute a virtual7 view Tv of T to show
only accessible data. Each X query Q over Tv is efficiently rewritten, using the
security view V (defined below in Section 3.1), to an equivalent X⇑[n,=] query Qt
over T, in order to return only accessible data.
3.1 Recursive Security Views
We redefine the security view over an access specification S=(D, ann) to be
V=(Dv, ann), where Dv is the view of D, computed by algorithm DeriveView
illustrated in Figure 4, and used by the users to formulate their queries.
We use first a DTD parser 8 to explore the DTD D into an expressive indexed
structure in such a way, for each element type A in D, the set of its children types
and descendant types are returned, also the content model P(A) is represented
as a tree where all sub-expressions composing P(A) are detected as we explain
in the next.
We define the recursive function Exp(A,access) that, according to a given ac-
cess specification S=(D,ann), extracts the content model for the element type
A and for all its descendant types in D. For each element type A parsed by
7The views of T are never materialized.
8Available at: http://www.rpbourret.com/dtdparser/index.htm.
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Figure 3: XML Access Control Framework.
Exp, we eliminate all inaccessible subelement types Bi of A (if ann(A,Bi)=N
exists) to compute the new content model Pv(A). The value access represents
the inherited accessibility. For a given content model "A −→ B1, (B2|B3)", we
refer by G1 opA G2 to the sub-expressions B1 and B2|B3 respectively, sepa-
rated by opA = ”, ”. The list Parsed is used (i) to store the extracted content
model of each element type in D ; and (ii) to avoid more than one parsing of
the same element type. By invoking Exp(root,true) in algorithm DeriveView,
the content models of all element types of D are computed. The value of
Parsed(A,true)=φ indicates that the element type A is not accessible, while
the value Parsed(A,true)=ǫ indicates that the content model of A is an empty
word. The output of algorithm DeriveView is a DTD viewDv = (Elev, Pv, root)
where Elev is computed by eliminating inaccessible element types from D, and
Pv returns the content model of each (accessible) element type in Dv.
The complexity of our DTD view derivation algorithm, DeriveView, is given
by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Let S=(D, ann) be an access specification, and P ′ be the largest
production in D, then the view Dv of D can be derived w.r.t S in at most
O(|D| ∗ |P ′|) time. 
Proof. For an element type A in D, we denote by |P (A)| the number of all
subelement types and operators (“,” or “|”) defining P(A). The procedure Exp
of Figure 4 works over the hierarchical, parse-tree representation of the regular
expression P(A). This tree is given using the DTD parser cited above, where
its intermediate nodes represent operators and the leaves are the subelement
types of A. Each operator links two or more element types/sub-expressions. To
compute the new content model of A, we parse all the element types Bi (i.e. the
leaves) of the P(A) tree to eliminate each inaccessible Bi (i.e. ann(A,Bi)=N
exists). Next, each node operator with no children nodes is eliminated. Finally,
the new resulting tree is translated into a regular expression which represents
the content model Pv(A). Thus, these steps are done by parsing all the nodes
of the P(A) tree in O(|P (A)|) time. If we consider that P ′ is the largest pro-
duction in D then O(|P (A)|) is bounded by O(|P ′|) and the content models of
all element types of D are computed in at most O(|D| ∗ |P ′|) time. 
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Algorithm: DeriveView
input : an access specification S=(D, ann) with D=(Ele, P, root).
output: a DTD view Dv .
1 {Elev,Pv} := {φ,φ};
2 Exp(root,true);
3 foreach element type A ∈ D do
4 if Parsed(A,true) 6= φ then
5 Elev := Elev ∪ A;
6 Pv(A) := Parsed(A,true);
7 Dv := (Elev , Pv , root);
8 return Dv ;
Procedure: Exp(A, access)
Input: an element type A, inherited accessibility access.
Output: content model of A.
1 if Parsed(A,access) 6= null then
2 return Parsed(A,access);
3 exp := φ;
4 case P(A) is str or ǫ
5 if access then
6 exp := str (ǫ resp);
7 case P(A) is G1 opA...opA Gn
// opA is "|" or ","
8 foreach subexpression Gi do
9 if Gi = B then // case of single element type
10 if ann(A,B) /∈ ann then
11 if access then
12 exp := exp opA B; Exp(B,true);
13 else if Exp(B,false) 6= φ then
14 exp := exp opA Exp(B,false);
15 else if ann(A,B) = Y then
16 exp := exp opA B; Exp(B,true);
17 else if ann(A,B) = N and Exp(B,false) 6= φ then
18 exp := exp opA Exp(B,false);
19 else /* ann(A,B) = [Q] */
20 exp := exp opA (B|ǫ);
21 Exp(B,true);
22 else if Gi = B∗ then
23 similar to the previous case except that in exp, B is replaced with
B* (also for Exp(B,true) and Exp(B,false));
24 else // Gi is composition of element types/subexpressions
25 define A′ in D as temporary element type;
26 define content model P (A′) := Gi;
27 if Exp(A′,access) 6= φ then
28 exp := exp opA Exp(A
′,access);
29 delete A′ from D and the Parsed(A′,access) entry;
30 if (exp = φ and access) then exp := ǫ;
31 Parsed(A,access):=exp;
32 return exp;
Figure 4: DTD View Derivation Algorithm.
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Figure 5: Example of Instance view.
3.2 Accessibility
Now we define the element node accessibility based on the use of recursive views:
Definition 3.1 Given a security view V=(Dv, ann) and a document T con-
forms to the original DTD D, then an element node n on T of type B with
parent node of type A is accessible (shown in the view Tv of T), if and only if
the following conditions hold:
i) The element node n is concerned by a valid annotation, or ann(A,B) does
not exist and there is an annotation defined over ancestor element n′ of n
where: n′ is the first ancestor element of n concerned by an annotation,
and this annotation is valid at n′.
ii) For each ancestor element n′ of n concerned by an annotation with value
[Q′], n′  Q′ must be verified. 
Example 3.1 Consider the DTD depicted in Figure 2(b) where annotation q
is ↓::D. For an element node n of type H within the instantiation of this DTD,
if its parent element is of type C then n is not accessible. Otherwise, the first
ancestor element of n which is concerned by an annotation can be either of
type F (i.e. ann(D,F )=N ), of type E (i.e. ann(D,E )=Y ), or of type A (i.e.
ann(root,A)=[q ]). This means that n may be accessible if its first ancestor
element is of type E or A, and it has no ancestor element n′ of type A with
n′ 2 q.
Note that the element node accessibility over recursive XML views cannot
be defined in X⇑. We consider the access specification S=(D, ann) composed
by the DTD of Figure 2(b) and the annotations depicted in the edges. Figure
5 represents (a) an instance T of D and (b) its view Tv computed according
to S. The query ↓+:: H over T must be rewritten to return only the node H2,
which is accessible w.r.t S. However ↓+:: H[↑+:: E or ↑+:: A[q]] returns both the
nodes H1 and H2, and ↓+:: H[(↑+:: E or ↑+:: A[q]) and not (↑+:: F )] rejects
the accessible node H2 shown in Tv. 
We use the predicates Aacc1 and A
acc
2 defined in Section 2.5 to satisfy the
accessibility conditions (i) and (ii) respectively of Definition 3.1.
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Definition 3.2 For any security view V=(Dv, ann) and any instance T con-
forms to the original DTD D, we define the accessibility predicate Aacc which
refers to an X⇑[n] qualifier such that, an element node n on T is accessible iff
n  Aacc, with Aacc := Aacc1 ∧ A
acc
2 . 
For an element type B in a DTD D, ↓+::B[Aacc] stands for all accessible B
elements in an instance of D.
Example 3.2 Consider the access specification depicted in Figure 2(b), the
predicates Aacc1 and A
acc
2 are defined as follows:
Aacc1 := ↑
∗::*[ε::root ∨ ε::A/↑::root ∨ ε::E/↑::D ∨ ε::F/↑::D
∨ ε::H/↑::C][1][ε::root ∨ ε::A[q]/↑::root ∨ ε::E/↑::D ]
Aacc2 := not (↑
+::A[not (q)]/↑:: root)
Consider the element node H1 of the XML document illustrated in Figure 5(a).
Then, H1〚↑∗::*[ε::A/↑::root ∨ ε::E/↑::D ∨ ε::F/↑::D ∨ ε::H/↑::C ∨ ε::root]〛
returns the set S={F 1,E1,A1,root} of ordered element nodes (element node H1
and/or some of its ancestor elements) where for each one an annotation exists
(e.g. ann(D,F )=N for element node F 1). Note that S[1] returns the ancestor
element F 1 and the final predicate Aacc1 over the element node H
1 of Figure
5(a) is not satisfied (i.e. H1 2 Aacc1 ) since the first ancestor element concerned
by an annotation in S is not accessible (F 1’s annotation is not valid). The query
↓+::H[Aacc] over the instance T of Figure 5(a) returns only the accessible ele-
ment H2 (shown in the view Tv of Figure 5(b)). 
Property 1. For any security view V=(Dv, ann), the accessibility predicate
Aacc can be constructed in O(|ann|) time. 
Proof. For any security view V=(Dv, ann), the construction of A
acc
1 and
Aacc2 depends only on the parsing of all annotations ann of V which is done in
O(|ann|) time. 
4 Query Rewriting over Recursive XML Views
In this section we describe our XPath-based query rewriting algorithm. Given
an access specification S=(D, ann), the security view V=(Dv, ann) of S, an in-
stance T conforms to D, and its virtual view Tv computed w.r.t V. Then, for
any query p over Tv, the goal of query rewriting is to find a rewriting function
that we define as:
X −→ X⇑[n,=]
p −→ Rewrite(p) such that p(Tv) = Rewrite(p)(T )
Our rewriting function Rewrite ensures that only accessible element nodes are
referred to by the subqueries of p, which is ensured by the accessibility pred-
icate of Definition 3.2. Moreover, the relationships defined between each two
subqueries of p must be respected.
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Figure 6: Query Rewriting Problems.
Notice that, for a given security view V=(Dv, ann), we compute first the
predicates Aacc and A+ w.r.t V in O(|ann|) time (Properties 1 and 2 resp.).
Also, for each element type A in Dv we compute the lists of its children types
and descendant types denoted by Reach(↓,A) and Reach(↓+,A) respectively.
Each list is computed in O(|Dv|) time. The lists of all element types of Dv
are computed in O(|Dv|
2) time. This preprocessing step is done only one time
after the security view V is defined and it provides performance gains during
the query rewriting step.
In this section, we consider the DTD view Dv shown in Figure 6(b) which
represents the derivation of the DTD D of Figure 6(a) with respect to the access
specification depicted in the edges. Figure 6(c) represents a valid instance T of
D and its derived view Tv is depicted in Figure 6(d).
4.1 Queries Without Predicates
For a DTD D=(Ele,P,root), we discuss the rewriting of queries without predi-
cates with the form axis1::E1/.../axisn::En where Ei ∈ {Ele,*} and axisi
is an XPath axis in fragment X . Given the query ↓+::Ei/↓
+::Ej , it is clear
that the rewritten query can be ↓+::Ei[A
acc]/↓+::Ej[A
acc] to return acces-
sible Ej elements which have at least one accessible ancestor element of type
Ei. However, it is not so simple in the case of child -axis.
Example 4.1 The query ↓+::A/↓::E over the view Tv of Figure 6(d) returns
E elements having an A element as parent. So the elements E1 and E2 are re-
turned. Using the kleene closure, this query can be rewritten over the instance
T of Figure 6(c) into: ↓+::A/↓::B/↓::D /(↓::B/↓::D )*/↓::E. However,
using the standard XPath, a cycle in the DTD cannot be replaced by ’↓+’. For
instance the query ↓+::A[Aacc]/↓+::E[Aacc] returns the elements E1, E2,
and E3, while E3 does not have a parent A. 
We use the predicate AB (B can be any element type) defined in Section 2.5
to rewrite the parent/child relation. For instance, the query ↓+::A/↓::E of
the previous example can be rewritten into ↓+::E[Aacc][AA] to return only
accessible E elements (verified with Aacc) which have an accessible parent of
type A (verified with AA).
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Example 4.2 Given the access specification of Figure 6(a), we define the pred-
icate A+ as follows:
A+ := ↑+::*[↑∗::*[ε::E/↑::D ∨ ε::B/↑::D ∨ ε::D /↑::C ∨
ε::B/↑::A ∨ ε::root][1][ε::E/↑::D ∨ ε::D /↑::C ∨ ε::root]].
At element node E3 of Figure 6(d), A+ returns the set of its ordered accessible
ancestor elements {D3,A3,root}, that we denote E3〚A+〛. The predicate AA
(i.e. A+[1]/ε::A) does not hold at element node E3 (i.e. E3 2 AA) since the
first accessible ancestor element of E3 is not of type A (i.e. A+[1] at E3 returns
its ancestor element D3). However, AA holds at element nodes E1 and E2. 
Property 2. For any security view V=(Dv, ann) and any element type B in
Dv, the predicates A
+ and AB can be constructed in O(|ann|) time. 
Proof. The same principle as the proof of Property 1. 
Finally, given a (recursive) security view V=(Dv, ann), we define the rewrit-
ing function Rewrite : X × Ele → χ⇑[n] that we use to rewrite an X query
p=p1/.../pn (where each subquery pi is given with axisi::Ei) over a node con-
text of type E in Dv, to an equivalent one Rewrite(p,E ) defined in X
⇑
[n] over
the original DTD as:
Rewrite(p,E) := ↓+::En[A
acc][prefix−1(p1/.../pn)]
Where the qualifier prefix−1(p1/.../pn) is recursively defined over the de-
scending list of subqueries of p. For each subquery pi, prefix
−1(p1/.../pi−1)
is already computed and used to compute prefix−1(p1/.../pi) as follows:
• axisi = ↓: prefix
−1(p1/.../pi) := A
Ei−1 [prefix−1(p1/.../pi−1)]
• axisi = ↓
+: prefix−1(p1/.../pi) := ↑
+::Ei−1[A
acc][prefix−1(p1/.../pi−1)]
Recall that E is the type of context node at which the query is evaluated. As a
special case we have: prefix−1(↓::E1)=A
E , and prefix−1(↓+::E1)=↑
+::E[Aacc].
Example 4.3 Consider the query ↓::A/↓::E over the node context root of the
view Tv of Figure 6(d). Using our algorithm Rewrite we obtain:
Rewrite(↓::A/↓::E, root) = ↓+::E[Aacc][AA[Aroot]]=
↓+::E[Aacc][A+[1]/ε::A[A+[1]/ε::root]]
A+ is given in Example 4.2. The evaluation of A+ returns {A1,root} at element
node E1, {A21,A2,root} at E2, and {D3,A3,root} at E3. With AA we ensure
that for an element node E referred to by the query, its first accessible ances-
tor element is of type A which is verified for E1, E2 and not for E3 in Tv of
Figure 6(d). Moreover, with Aroot we ensure that the A element returned by
AA, which can be A1 or A21 for element nodes E1 and E2 respectively, must
have root as the first accessible ancestor which is verified only for A1. Thus the
query Rewrite(↓::A/↓::E, root) at root of Figure 6(d) returns {E1}. 
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Algorithm: Rewrite
input : A query p, and an element type A for which query rewriting is carried.
output: a rewritten query pt w.r.t A.
1 if p = p1∪...∪pn then
2 return ∪≤i≤n Rewrite(pi,A );
3 reach := {A};
4 compute the descending list L of subqueries of p;
5 each subquery pi = axisi::Ei[fi];
6 pt := ǫ; filters := ǫ;
// compute prefix−1(p) to be pt
7 foreach pi in the order of L do
// axes rewriting
8 case axisi =↓
9 if (filters = ǫ) then
10 pt := Afs(reach,ε)[pt];
11 else
12 pt := Afs(reach,ε)[filters][pt];
13 case axisi =↓
+
14 if (filters = ǫ) then
15 pt := fs(reach, ↑+)[Aacc][pt];
16 else
17 pt := fs(reach, ↑+)[Aacc][filters][pt];
// ∗-label elimination
18 if (Ei = ∗) then
19 reach := ∪E∈reachReach(axisi, E);
20 else if (∃ E ∈ reach s.t Ei ∈ Reach(axisi, E)) then
21 reach := {Ei};
22 else
23 reach := {};
24 if ( reach={}) then return φ;
// rewriting of predicate fi over reach elements
25 filters := RW_Pred(fi,reach);
26 if (filters = false) then // invalid predicate
27 return φ;
28 else if (filters = true) then // omitte fi from pi
29 filters := ǫ;
// rewritten query pt of p w.r.t A
30 if (filters = ǫ) then
31 pt := fs(reach, ↓+)[Aacc][pt];
32 else
33 pt := fs(reach, ↓+)[Aacc][filters][pt];
34 return pt;
Figure 7: Algorithm for XPath Queries Rewriting.
The detail of Function Rewrite is given in Figure 7. After computing the
descending list L of p’s subqueries, we parse them to generate the prefix−1 of
the rewritten query as explained above. The node context A can be initialized
to root of the DTD for rewriting p over the entire document. If pi is axisi::*,
then the *-label is replaced by the set of children/descendant types of Ei−1
(axisi is ↓ or ↓
+ resp.). Then, the rewriting of pi over pi−1 can result in a set of
element types denoted by reach. Moreover, if Ei 6=*, then it must exist at least
one element type E in reach (result of the rewriting of pi−1) where Ei is a child
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type of E if axisi =↓ or one of its descendant types if axisi =↓
+ (lines 18-23).
If the rewriting of pi over pi−1 stands for an empty set reach then the query is
rejected (line 24). By fs we refer to the function fusion, e.g. fs({E1, ..., En}, ↑
+)
= (↑+::E1 ∪ ..∪ ↑
+::En).
Function RW_Pred, called in the algorithm Rewrite, represents the predi-
cates rewriting, which is the subject of the next section. As shown above, up-
ward -axes and the position predicate are necessary for rewriting simple queries
(without predicates). We prove below that fragment X⇑[n] is not closed under
query rewriting. Extending this fragment with the node comparaison operator
(which results in the final fragment X⇑[n,=]) turns out sufficient to rewrite any
query in X .
Theorem 3 For recursive XML security views, the XPath fragment X⇑[n] is not
closed under query rewriting. 
Proof. (by contradiction) We consider query with the form E[q] which
represents the rewriting limitation of the XPath fragment X⇑[n]. Assume that
the query rewriting can be done in X⇑[n]. The query ↓
+::A[↓::E] over the view in-
stance Tv depicted in Figure 6(d) cannot be correctly rewritten, using the previ-
ous definition of algorithm Rewrite, into Rewrite(↓+::A,root)[Rewrite(↓::E,A)]
equivalent to ↓+::A[Aacc][↓+::E[Aacc][AA]]. Indeed, the resulting query returns
{A1, A2, A21}, but A2 does not have an immediate child E. The limitation
is due to the fact that predicate [↓::E] must return all descendant elements E
having as the first accessible ancestor the node context A at which the predicate
is evaluated (i.e. the element node returned by ↓::E/A+[1] must be the same
element node of type A at which the predicate is evaluated). This cannot be
expressed in X⇑[n] and can be done only by introducing the node set comparison
(e.g. X⇑[n,=]) as we will present in the following. 
4.2 Predicates Rewriting
We explain the rewriting of predicates to complete the definition of our rewrit-
ing algorithm Rewrite. For a given query axis1::E1[q1]/.../axisn::En[qn], we
rewrite each predicate qi over the element type Ei at which qi is defined. Given
a security view V=(Dv, ann) and a subquery E[q] (we take a simple predi-
cate q=q1/.../qn where qi=axisi::Ei for more comprehension). We define the
function RW_Pred : X × Ele → X⇑[n,=] to rewrite the predicate q in X over
element type E in Dv, to an equivalent one RW_Pred(q, E) in X
⇑
[n,=], recursively
defined over the descending list of sub-predicates of q as follows:
• axisi =↓: RW_Pred(qi/.../qn,Ei−1) :=
↓+::Ei[A
acc][RW_Pred(qi+1/.../qn,Ei)]/A
+[1] = ε::Ei−1
• axisi =↓
+: RW_Pred(qi/.../qn,Ei−1) :=
↓+::Ei[A
acc][RW_Pred(qi+1/.../qn,Ei)]
Given a query axisi::Ei[axisj ::Ej=”c”] (text-content comparison), we have the
following rewriting:
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RW_Pred(↓::Ej=”c”,Ei) := ↓
+::Ej[A
acc][ε::*=”c”]/A+[1] = ε::Ei
RW_Pred(↓+::Ej=”c”,Ei) := ↓
+::Ej[A
acc][ε::*=”c”]
Example 4.4 The query ↓+::A[↓::E], given in the proof of Theorem 3, is
rewritten into:
Rewrite(↓+::A[↓::E], root) = ↓+::A[Aacc][↑+::root[Aacc]][RW_Pred(↓::E, A)]
≡ ↓+::A[Aacc][↓+::E[Aacc]/A+[1]=ε::A]
where ↑+::root[Aacc] is omitted since root is always accessible. The rewritten
query over Tv of Figure 6(d), returns the element nodes A
1 and A21. 
The detail of Function RW_Pred is given in Figure 8. We have seen in Rewrite
algorithm that the rewriting of subquery axisi+1::* over Ei results in a set of
element types (reach) reachable from Ei. Then, the predicate q in axisi::Ei[q]
is rewritten over element type Ei (Ei 6=*) as explained in the above definition
of RW_Pred. While the predicate q in axisi::Ei/axisi+1::*[q] is rewritten
over the set of element types resulting by the rewriting of axisi+1::* over Ei.
We denote this set by L. For a given predicate q1/.../qn over element type
E, L :=reach(q1,{E}) denotes the result of rewriting sub-predicate q1 over E
(element types reachable from E with q1), sub-predicate q2 is rewritten over L
resulting in a new set L :=reach(q2,L) (i.e. L :=reach(q2,reach(q1,{E}))),
and so on until rewriting qn over L:=reach(qn−1,L). Each sub-predicate qi
can contain other sub-predicates (case of axisi::Ei[fi]). The *-labels in the
sub-predicates are eliminated with the same principle explained in algorithm
Rewrite using the precomputed lists of children and descendant types (Reach).
The rewriting result of predicate q can be false if some element types in q are
inaccessible (they do not appear in Dv) or some relationships are not respected
(e.g. the rewriting of predicate ↓::Ei over element type Ei−1 is false if Ei is not
a subelement type of Ei−1, such that Ei /∈ Reach(↓,Ei−1)). Rewriting result
can be true (the predicate is omitted from the query) in case of not(q) with non
valid q.
Example 4.5 Consider the query ↓+::A[↓::*/↓::D ] over the Figure 6(b). Using
our algorithm RW_Pred, the predicate ↓::*/↓::D is rewritten over element type
A as follows:
[RW_Pred(↓::*/↓::D,A)] =
[(↓+::A∪ ↓+::D∪ ↓+::E)[Aacc][RW_Pred(↓::D,{A, D, E})]/A+[1]=ε::A] =
[(↓+::A∪ ↓+::D∪ ↓+::E)[Aacc][↓+::D [Aacc]/A+[1]=ε::*]/A+[1]=ε::A]. 
Now, we generalize the formal definition of the algorithm Rewrite given in
the previous section to handle predicates. Given the query p1/.../pn where
pi = axisi::Ei[fi] and fi ([fi] is optional) is a predicate defined over element
type Ei. We rewrite this query over node context of type E as follows:
Rewrite(p,E) := ↓+::En[A
acc][f ′n][prefix
−1(p1/.../pn)]
where an intermediate step, prefix−1(p1/.../pi) is recursively defined with:
• axisi = ↓: prefix
−1(p1/.../pi) := A
Ei−1 [f ′i−1][prefix
−1(p1/.../pi−1)]
• axisi = ↓
+: prefix−1(p1/.../pi) :=
↑+::Ei−1[A
acc][f ′i−1][prefix
−1(p1/.../pi−1)]
where f ′i−1 := RW_Pred(fi−1, Ei−1).
RR n° 7834
22 H. Mahfoud and A. Imine
Algorithm: RW_Pred
input : a predicate q and a list L of element types.
output: a rewritten predicate qt w.r.t element types in L.
1 qt := false, f ′ := true;
/* content-test is optional, if it does not exists then [ε::E=c] below is
omitted */
2 if (q is a single predicate axis::E[f]= c) then // [f] is optional
3 if (E = ∗) then
4 reach(q,L) := ∪E′∈LReach(axisi, vE
′);
5 else if (∃ E′ ∈ L s.t E ∈ Reach(axisi, E
′)) then
6 reach(q,L) := {E};
7 else
8 reach(q,L) := {};
9 if ( reach(q,L)={}) then return false;
// rewriting of f ′ if [f] exists
10 f ′ := RW_Pred (f,E);
11 if ( [f ] exists and f ′ = false) then
12 return false;
// [f ′] below is omitted if f ′=true
13 if (axis =↓) then
14 qt := fs(↓+, reach(q, L))[Aacc][f ′][ε::E=c]/A+[1]=ε::∗;
15 else
16 qt := fs(↓+, reach(q, L))[Aacc][f ′][ε::E=c];
17 else if (q is qf/qr where qf = axis1::E[f] and qr is the remaining steps)
then
18 rewrite qf as done in lines 3-16 ;
19 q′r := RW_Pred (qr,reach(qf,L));
20 if (q′r=false) then return false;
21 if (axis1 =↓) then
22 qt := fs(↓+, reach(qf , L))[A
acc][f ′][q′r]/A
+[1]=ε::∗;
23 else
24 qt := fs(↓+, reach(qf , L))[A
acc][f ′][q′r];
25 else if (q is q1∧...∧qn) then
26 if (∃ qi s.t RW_Pred(qi,L)= false) then
27 qt := false;
28 else if (RW_Pred(qi,L)= true for each qi) then
29 qt := true;
30 else
31 qt :=
∧
RW _Pred(qi,L) 6=true
RW_Pred (qi,L);
32 else if (q is q1∨...∨qn or q1∪...∪qn) then
33 if (∃ qi s.t RW_Pred(qi,L)= true) then
34 qt := true;
35 else
36 qt :=
∨
RW _Pred(qi,L) 6=false
RW_Pred (qi,L);
37 else if case of not (q) then
38 if RW_Pred(q,L)= false then
39 qt := true;
40 else if RW_Pred(q,L) 6= true then
41 qt := not (RW_Pred (q,L));
42 else if case of ǫ then
43 qt := true;
44 return qt;
Figure 8: Predicate Rewriting.
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4.3 Complexity Analysis
Given a security specification S=(D,ann), we extract first the security view
V=(Dv, ann) corresponding to S, where Dv is derived using our algorithm
DeriveView of Figure 4. The user is allowed to request its authorized data
represented with the DTD view Dv. For each query Q in X , our algorithm
Rewrite translates this query to an equivalent one Qt in X
⇑
[n,=] such that, for
any instance T conforms to D, its virtual view Tv conforms to Dv, we have
Q(Tv)=Rewrite(Q)(T ).
The overall complexity time of our rewriting algorithm Rewrite is stated as
follows:
Theorem 4 For any security view V=(Dv, ann) and any X query Q over the
DTD view Dv, the algorithm Rewrite computes an equivalent query Qt in X
⇑
[n,=]
over the original DTD in at most O(|Q| ∗ |Dv|
2) time. 
Proof. Given an X query p=axis1::E1[q1]/.../axisn::En[qn], we denote by
|p| the number of subqueries and sub-predicates of p, e.g. |↓::E1[not(↓
+::*)]|=2.
Each subquery (or sub-predicate) pi=axisi::Ei[qi] of p must be rewritten over
pi−1=axisi−1::Ei−1[qi−1] to check the accessibility of Ei and to preserve the
relationship defined between Ei and Ei−1. This is done in a constant time
by using the precomputed predicates Aacc and A+ as in lines 8-17 of algorithm
Rewrite and lines 13-16 of algorithm RW_Pred. The *-label of each subquery (or
sub-predicate) is eliminated as done in the lines 18-23 of algorithm Rewrite, and
lines 3-8 of algorithm RW_Pred, which causes an additional cost |Dv|
2. For in-
stance, to rewrite the query ↓::* over the set reach, the elimination of the *-label
amounts to parse each element type E in reach and compute the union of its
children types given by the precomputed list Reach(↓,E) (|Reach(↓,E)|=O|Dv|).
Next, the *-label of the query ↓::* is replaced by the union of children types of
element types in reach which is done in at most O|Dv|
2 time. Thus, a given
query p can be rewritten in at most O(|p| ∗ |Dv|
2) time. 
4.4 Query Rewriting Improvements
We discuss in this section some possible implementations of our rewriting algo-
rithm Rewrite to improve the overall complexity of Theorem 4.
The first optimization can be done by avoiding the *-label elimination step
discussed above. For a security view V=(Dv, ann), an X query Q over the DTD
view Dv can be rewritten in a linear time O(|Q|). Using the precomputed predi-
cates Aacc and A+, each subquery pi of the query p can be rewritten over pi−1 in
a constant time by adding the predicate AEi−1 (i.e. A+[1]/ε::Ei−1) or A
acc, case
of axisi=↓ and axisi=↓
+ respectively. For instance, the query ↓::*/↓::B over
context node of type A can be rewritten into ↓+::B[Aacc][A+[1]/ε::*/A+[1]/ε::A].
In the same way, each sub-predicate qi=axisi::Ei can be rewritten over qi−1
in a constant time into ↓+::Ei[A
acc]/A+[1]=ε::Ei−1 in case of axisi=↓, or into
↓+::Ei[A
acc] otherwise. For instance, the predicate [↓::*/↓::C] over element type
B can be rewritten into: [↓+::*[Aacc][↓+::C[Aacc]/A+[1]=ε::*]/A+[1]=ε::B].
Thus, the rewriting of the query p depends on the parsing of all its subqueries
and sub-predicates which is done in O(|p|) time.
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Since the query answering time concerns the rewriting time and the eval-
uation time of the rewritten query, then the existence of the *-label in the
rewritten query can induce for poor performance when some inaccessible ele-
ments are parsed by the rewritten query. For instance, given the query ↓::E
over context node n of type A with E=*. Without eliminating the *-label,
this query is rewritten into ↓+::E[Aacc][AA], and then for each descendant node
of n of any element type, the predicates Aacc and AA are evaluated. To im-
prove the query evaluation time, the elimination of the *-label in the query is
indispensable and ensures that two defined predicates are evaluated only at ac-
cessible descendant nodes of n (i.e. whose types appear in Dv). This elimination
can give good performance since the size of Dv (number of accessible element
types) is too small than the size of the original DTD D in practice. For this
reason, the precomputed lists Reach can be sorted in such a way the union of
the children/descendant types of two element types of Dv (e.g. Reach(↓,E1) ∪
Reach(↓,E2)) can be linear on the size of Dv. Accordingly, the *-label elimina-
tion phase, done in lines 18-23 of algorithm Rewrite and lines 3-8 of algorithm
RW_Pred, can be efficiently improved to take at most |Dv| time and any query
p can be rewritten in this case in at most O(|p| ∗ |Dv|) time.
5 Extensions
We discuss some extensions of our proposed rewriting approach to deal with a
large fragment of XPath queries, and to overcome some limitations of existing
access specifications languages.
5.1 Upward-axes Rewriting
For the rewriting of upward-axes (↑ and ↑+), we extend the algorithms Rewrite
and RW_Pred without increasing the complexity of the global rewriting (as ex-
plained in Theorem 4).
In Rewrite, prefix−1(p1/.../pi) is defined over upward-axes as follows:
• axisi =↑ : prefix
−1(p1/.../pi) :=
↓+::Ei−1[A
acc][f ′i−1][prefix
−1(p1/.../pi−1)]/A
+[1]=ε::Ei
• axisi =↑
+ : prefix−1(p1/.../pi) :=
↓+::Ei−1[A
acc][f ′i−1][prefix
−1(p1/.../pi−1)]
where f ′i := RW_Pred(fi, Ei).
In RW_Pred, an intermediate predicate qi/../qn (qi=axisi::Ei[fi]) is rewritten
over element type Ei−1 in case of upward-axes as follows:
• axisi =↑: RW_Pred(qi/.../qn,Ei−1) :=
AEi[f ′i][RW_Pred(qi+1/.../qn,Ei)]
• axisi =↑
+: RW_Pred(qi/.../qn,Ei−1) :=
↑+::Ei[A
acc][f ′i][RW_Pred(qi+1/.../qn,Ei)]
where f ′i := RW_Pred(fi, Ei).
Inria
Secure Querying of Recursive XML Views: A Standard XPath-based Technique25
5.2 Revision of Access Specifications
The node accessibility w.r.t the specification value [Q ] has been defined with
two different meanings [4, 9]. Like in [4], we have assumed in the definition of
the element node accessibility that for each element node n concerned by an
annotation of value [Q ], if Q is not valid at n (i.e. n 2 Q) then n and all its
descendant elements are not accessible, even if there is some valid annotations
defined over these descendants (condition (ii) of Definition 3.1). However, in [9]
the element node n can be not accessible (i.e. n 2 Q), but one of its descendant
element B′ can be accessible if it is concerned by a valid annotation.
We assume that both meanings are useful and an access control specification
language must provide the definition of each of them. For this reason, we redefine
the access specification of Definition 2.1 as follows:
Definition 5.1 An access specification S is a pair (D, ann) consisting of a DTD
D and a partial mapping ann such that, for each production A→ P (A) and each
element type B in P(A), ann(A,B), if explicitly defined, is an annotation of the
form:
ann(A,B) := Y | N | [Q] | Nh | [Q]h

Given an element node n of type B with parent node of type A, then with the
specification values N and [Q ], accessibility overwriting is allowed under n even
though ann(A,B)=N or ann(A,B)=[Q ] and n 2 Q. The semantics of the new
specification values Nh and [Q ]h are given as follows. If the element node n is
concerned by an annotation with value Nh, then no overwriting of this value is
permitted to descendant elements of n, i.e. if n′ is a descendant element of n,
then n′ is not accessible even if it is concerned by a valid annotation. While if
n is concerned by an annotation with value [Q]h, then the annotations defined
under n (i.e. under B element type) take effect only if n  Q. For instance, if a
descendant element n′ of n is concerned by an annotation of value [Q′], then n′
is accessible only if n′  Q′ and n  Q. We call the annotation with value Nh
or [Q]h, downward-closed annotation.
Example 5.1 We consider the hospital DTD of Figure 9(a) and we give the
following access specification:
• A patient can access only to its own diagnosis information:
ann(department, patient) = [pname=$name]h
ann(patient, parent) = ann(patient, sibling)=Nh
ann(patient, visit) = N, ann(medication, diagnosis) = Y
• A research institute can access to patients whose have "disease1":
ann(department, patient) = ann(parent, patient) = ann(sibling, patient)
= [visit/treatment/medication[diagnosis=’disease1’]]
For the first policy, $name is a variable system denoting patient’s name. For
a given patient with name ”Bob”, if p 2 pname=”Bob” then all the frag-
ment rooted at p is hidden from the patient ”Bob” and any annotation un-
der element node p can be applied since it is the medical data of another pa-
tient. Also, the annotation ann(patient, parent)=Nh cannot be defined with
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Figure 9: Hospital DTD.
ann(patient, parent)=N otherwise ann(medication, diagnosis)=Y makes diag-
nosis information of parent accessible to patient ”Bob” as its own information.
The same principle is applied with the annotation ann(patient, sibling)=Nh.
For the second policy, it is clear that a false evaluation of the predicate does not
imply the inaccessibility of the sub patients, i.e. a given patient may not have
"disease1", while its parent/sibling can be affected by this disease and must be
shown to the research institute. 
The new access specification defined can be taken into account simply by
applying the following changes in our rewriting approach. The predicate Aacc1
is redefined with:9
Aacc1 := ↑
∗::*[ε::root ∨ann(A′,A)∈ann ε::A/↑::A
′][1]
[ε::root ∨(ann(A′,A)=Y |[Q]|[Q]h)∈ann ε::A.σ(A
′, A)/↑::A′]
While The predicate Aacc2 is redefined with:
Aacc2 :=
∧
(ann(A′,A)=Nh)∈ann
not (↑+::A/↑::A′)
∧
(ann(A′,A)=[Q]h)∈ann
not (↑+::A[not (Q )]/↑::A′)
6 Experimental Results
We have developed a prototype to improve effectiveness of our rewriting ap-
proach. The performance study is done using a real-life recursive DTD and a
various forms of XPath queries. The experimental results show the efficiency
of our XPath query rewriting approach w.r.t the answering approach based on
the materialization of the view. Notice that we cannot do comparison between
our approach and the two existing approaches which deal with queries rewriting
under recursive views [5, 8], since they are based on the non-standard language
"regular XPath", and no practical tool is present to evaluate regular XPath
queries. The experiments were conducted using Ubuntu system, with a dual
Core 2.53 GHz and 1 GB of memory.
XML Documents. Using ToXGene generator [1], we generated set of XML
documents that conform to the hospital DTD of Figure 9 and with sizes ranging
from 10MB to 100MB.
9Note that A.σ(A′, A) gives A[Q] if ann(A′,A)=[Q]|[Q]h and A otherwise.
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Security Specification. Figure 9(b) represents the hospital DTD view Dv of a
research institute studying inherited patterns of some diseases. This view shows
only patients having one or more disease from {disease1, disease2, disease3}
with their parent hierarchy, and denies access to their name, address, test and
doctor data. Formally, we define this view with the following annotations:
1. ann(hospital)=Y
2. ann(hospital,name)=N
3. ann(hospital,department)=N
4. ann(department,patient)=
[↓::visit/↓::treatment/↓::medication[↓::diagnosis=’disease1’ or
↓::diagnosis=’disease2’ or ↓::diagnosis=’disease3’]]h
5. ann(patient,pname)=N
6. ann(patient,address)=N
7. ann(patient,sibling)=Nh
8. ann(visit,date)=N
9. ann(visit,treatment)=N
10. ann(medication,diagnosis)=Y
11. ann(test,type)=Y
The annotation 7 must be downward-closed, otherwise the annotations 10 and
11 can overwrite some sibling data (diagnosis and type of visit) to be accessible.
XPath Queries. We define the following set of XPath queries :
1. Q1. ↓::patient[↓
+::visit[↓::diagnosis=’disease1’ or
↓::diagnosis=’disease2’ or ↓::diagnosis=’disease3’]].
2. Q2. ↓
+::patient[↓::visit[↓::diagnosis=’disease1’ or
↓::diagnosis=’disease2’ or ↓::diagnosis=’disease3’] and
not (↓+::patient/↓::visit[↓::diagnosis=’disease1’ or
↓::diagnosis=’disease2’ or ↓::diagnosis=’disease3’])].
3. Q3. ↓
+::diagnosis[↑::visit/↑::*/↑::*/↑::*/↑::hospital]
The first query returns patients whose some of its ancestors also had the sames
diseases. The Second query Q2 returns the first generation where the discussed
diseases appeared for the first time, and Q3 represents the diagnosis of the
second generation of infected patients. Each query Qi is rewritten over the root
node (hospital) of each document into Rewrite(Qi,hospital), and this by using
the security view V=(Dv, ann) defined with the DTD view of Figure 9(b) and
the annotations defined above.
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Figure 10: XPath Queries Evaluation Time.
Approaches. A comparison is done between our rewriting approach and the
materialization approach. Given a security view V=(Dv, ann), the materializa-
tion consists in incorporating an accessibility label (+/-) to each element node
in the document which is concerned by an annotation of V. Each element node
n, not yet labeled (i.e. no invalid downward-closed annotation is defined over
its ancestor elements), is labeled with “+” if it is concerned by an annotation
with value Y or with value [Q]|[Q]h and n  Q (resp. n is labeled with “-”
in case of annotation with value N |Nh or with value [Q]|[Q]h and n 2 Q). In
case of an element node n concerned by an invalid downward-closed annotation
(with value Nh or with value [Q]h and n 2 Q), the n and all its descendant
elements are labeled with “-”. After applying all the annotations of the security
view V over the document, each unlabeled element node is annotated by in-
heritance from its nearest labeled ancestor element. The obtained document is
called fully annotated document. Finally, the materialized view of the original
document is computed by deleting all inaccessible element nodes (labeled with
“-”) from the fully annotated document and user queries are evaluated directly
over this view. Thus, we compare the answering time of the materialization
approach (defined as the view materialization time and query evaluation time
over the materialized view) with that of our rewriting approach (defined as the
rewriting time of the query and the evaluation time of the rewritten query over
the original document).
Performance Results. The experimental results are shown in Figure 10 where
the answering time of each query is evaluated using our rewriting algorithm and
the materialization approach. The size of the answer ranges from few hundred
to a few thousand of nodes. Figure 10 shows clearly that our algorithm remains
more efficient than the materialization approach.
We observe first that the translation of XPath queries from X to X⇑[n,=] does
not induce for a poor performance and the average of the answering time of
our rewriting approach remains in general less than 8 seconds for a large XML
document. Second, a query containing time-consuming elements like *-labels
or parent axes does not degrade the rewriting performance as shown with the
query Q3.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed approach yields the first practical solution to rewrite XPath
queries over recursive XML views using only the expressive power of the stan-
dard XPath. The extension of the downward class of XPath queries with some
axes and operators has been investigated in order to make queries rewriting
possible under recursion.
The conducted experimentation shows the efficiency of our approach by com-
parison with the materialization approach. Most importantly, the translation
of queries from X to X⇑[n,=] does not impact the performance of the queries
answering. We have discussed how our approach can be extended to deal with
the upward-axes without additional cost. Lastly, a revision of the access speci-
fication language is presented to go beyond some limitations in the definition of
some access privileges.
As future work, we plan first to provide an optimized version of our approach
and also to use the same principle to secure XML updating.
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